The Lessons of Capturing the Friedmans: Moral Panic, Institutional Denial and Due Process by Bandes, Susan
DePaul University 
Via Sapientiae 
College of Law Faculty College of Law 
6-2007 
The Lessons of Capturing the Friedmans: Moral Panic, 
Institutional Denial and Due Process 
Susan Bandes 
DePaul College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/lawfacpubs 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Susan A. Bandes, The Lessons of Capturing the Friedmans: Moral Panic, Institutional Denial, and Due 
Process, 3 The J of L, Cul and Hum 93 (2007) 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in College of Law Faculty by an authorized administrator of Via Sapientiae. For more 
information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
The Lessons of Capturing the
Friedmans: Moral Panic,
Institutional Denial and Due
Process
Susan Bandes
DePaul University College of Law, Chicago
In the 1980’s hundreds of childcare workers were accused of sexually abusing
children in horrific ways. Arnold and Jesse Friedman, whose prosecutions are
chronicled in the film Capturing the Friedmans, were among those convicted and
sent to prison during this period. Sociologists have called this series of prosecu-
tions a classic moral panic: a widespread, hostile, volatile overreaction to a per-
ceived societal threat. This paper examines the concept of moral panic in the
context of the day care sexual abuse prosecutions in general, and the Friedman
prosecutions in particular. It begins by exploring the role of the legal system in
the construction of a moral panic, asking how a system which styles itself as
rational and process oriented becomes the handmaiden of institutionalized hys-
teria. It then considers whether moral panic is a useful heuristic for understand-
ing how justice was derailed in the Friedman cases and so many others, and
what ought to be done to address the problem. It argues that the concept is
limited in its ability to distinguish normatively between cases of overreaction
and cases of institutional denial. Further, it suggests that, to the extent the con-
cept of moral panic misconceives these periods of institutionalized hysteria as a
series of isolated phenomena, it does not adequately address the deeply
entrenched causes of injustice in cases like the Friedman prosecutions. The
paper ultimately concludes that the concept of moral panic is useful because it
reminds us of the cultural and historical contingency of notions of criminal just-
ice and criminal deviance. Nevertheless, the concept has limitations that render
it inadequate to address the hurdles to justice encountered in the Friedman
cases. Most prominently, the concept is hindered by its retrospective nature.
Like the question of guilt or innocence, the notion of moral panic is backward-
looking, and therefore not well suited to addressing the prospective question of
how the justice system can be reformed to dismantle ongoing, systemic hurdles
to criminal justice. Law, Culture and the Humanities 2007; 3: 293–319
In the 1980’s hundreds of childcare workers were accused of sexually abus-
ing children in horrific ways.1 Some of the accusations defied belief: horses
© 2007 Association for the Study of Law, Culture and the Humanities 10.1177/1743872107076384
Law, Culture and the Humanities 2007; 3: 293–319
Address for correspondence: Susan Bandes, Distinguished Research Professor, DePaul
University College of Law, 25 E. Jackson Blvd., Chicago, IL 60604. 
E-mail: sbandes@depaul.edu
1. In California alone, in high profile investigations in Bakersfield and Manhattan Beach,
“hundreds of . . . children were naming ministers, reporters, soccer coaches, aerobics
instructors, grade school teachers and babysitters as abusers.” Debbie Nathan and
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sacrificed in broad daylight to intimidate children, ritual slaughter of babies,
alien abductions, children transmogrified into mice.2 Most of these charges
turned out to be entirely unfounded, though often not until the accused had
been convicted and served time; sometimes many years in prison. Although
many of these prosecutions have been discredited, and the majority of the
sentences overturned, some of those convicted remain in prison and all con-
tinue to suffer the consequences of their ordeals. Many of the child witnesses
who sent these men and women to prison have grown up living with crip-
pling guilt or terrible confusion about their testimony and its aftermath.3
Sociologists have classified this series of day care sexual abuse prosecu-
tions as a classic moral panic. In brief, a moral panic is commonly defined as
a widespread, hostile, volatile overreaction to a perceived threat to societal
well-being.4 It is a sort of institutionalized hysteria: the product of the inter-
locking acts of many institutions and forces, including pressure groups, polit-
icians, and the media. The various institutions form a sort of echo chamber –
continually reinforcing one another and increasing the decibel level expo-
nentially. The legal system, in the conventional wisdom, should be immune
to such hysteria, and indeed, should act as a rational and calming force. All
too often, however, the creation of a moral panic depends on the complicity
and active participation of the legal system. Legal actors – police, prosecu-
tors, defense attorneys, expert witnesses, judges, juries – have, in various
ways, the power to affirmatively fuel the creation of institutionalized hys-
teria, as occurred with the day care abuse cases. One might understand how
parents fearful for their children become caught up in the hysteria of the
moment. It is more difficult to fathom the dynamics by which the legal sys-
tem, which styles itself as rational, process oriented, and transcending pas-
sion and prejudice, becomes the handmaiden of institutionalized hysteria.
Andrew Jarecki’s documentary Capturing the Friedmans5 is a remarkable
exploration of one of the day care sexual abuse cases. It examines the case
of Arnold and Jesse Friedman, a father and his teenaged son, accused of a
shocking pattern of sexually abusing boys in their care. The incidents 
were said to have occurred during an after-school computer class held for 
8 to 11-year-old children in the Friedmans’ home in affluent Great Neck,
New York in the mid 1980’s, a time at which concern about day care sexual
abuse had reached a fever pitch both in the United States and abroad.
Jarecki presents the unfolding case through multiple and often contra-
dictory viewpoints, giving narrative voice to accused and victims, to police,
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Michael Snedeker, Satan’s Silence: Ritual Abuse and the Making of a Modern Witch Hunt
(Basic Books, 1995). Investigations in Massachusetts, North Carolina, Florida and else-
where led to scores of additional accusations.
2. Dorothy Rabinowitz, No Crueler Tyrannies: Accusation, False Witness, and Other Terrors of
Our Times (New York: Free Press 2003).
3. See e.g. Maggie Jones, “Who Was Abused?” New York Times Magazine 77–81, September
19, 2004.
4. Erich Goode and Nachman Ben-Yehuda, “Moral Panics: Culture, Politics, and Social
Construction,” 20 Annual Review of Sociology 149, 156–159 (1994). I will consider the con-
cept of moral panic in more detail shortly.
5. Magnolia Pictures 2003, Home Box Office Inc.
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prosecutors, defense attorneys and judges, and withholding, at least ostensi-
bly,6 his own judgments on the truth of the allegations.
The film’s apparent template is Rashomon7 (the film about multiple per-
spectives that has come to represent the impossibility of arriving at an
objective or omniscient truth)8 rather than The Thin Blue Line 9 (a film that
sought to document and correct a miscarriage of justice).10 Capturing the
Friedmans tells a complex, challenging story without clear heroes and vil-
lains, without an omniscient narrator or even a strong narrative voice, and
without the all important “sense of an ending”11 that an audience generally
requires. Audiences leave the theater shaken; uncertain of the moral of the
filmic story,12 but jolted from complacent belief in the stock legal story of
dispassionate justice.13 Yet though the film casts off or challenges familiar
narrative conventions, it succeeds in telling a galvanizing story, suggesting
that there is some organizing principle, some overarching theme, perhaps
even a moral, lurking in this studiously “neutral” work.
One potentially useful way of framing the story is as a close-up view of the
construction of a moral panic.14 The moral panic construct is itself a kind of
narrative structure; a way of making sense of a seemingly disparate series of
events by placing it in a cultural context. I will begin by considering the value
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6. Several critics argue that Jarecki’s belief that injustice had been done was obvious. See
e.g. Sharon Waxman, “Victims Say Film on Molesters Distorts Facts,” New York Times,
February 24, 2003 (arguing that the film’s selective use of evidence created undue sym-
pathy for the Friedmans); ‘“Capturing the Friedmans ’: Art, Truth, and Marketing,” April
20, 2004 (www.richardwebster.net) (arguing that the film only pretended to be even-
handed, and actually conveyed a belief that the Friedmans were railroaded); Harvey
Silvergate, “Picture of Injustice,” The Boston Phoenix, September 15, 2004 (arguing that
Jarecki’s “studied ambiguity” was morally problematic in light of his apparent convic-
tion that the Friedmans were innocent). See also infra note 64 (discussing Jarecki’s own
views, as expressed to Charlie Rose).
7. Rashomon, (Daiei Motion Picture Co., 1950; RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 1952).
8. See Orit Kamir, “Judgment by Film: Socio-Legal Functions of Rashomon,” 12 Yale J.L.
& Humanities 39, 39 (2000) (“Rashomon has come to embody a general cultural notion
of the relativity of truth.”)
9. The Thin Blue Line (Third Floor Prods., 1988). The film, an expose of the process which
led to the conviction of Randall Dale Adams for murder, “triggered an official inquiry
into the case that culminated in Adams’ release from prison.” Richard K. Sherwin, “Law
Frames: Historical Truth and Narrative Necessity in a Criminal Case,” 47 Stan. L. Rev.
39, 46 (1994).
10. As I will discuss later, the film bears a closer resemblance to a Thin Blue Line-style
expose than is immediately apparent.
11. Frank Kermode, The Sense of an Ending 127 (1967) (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2nd ed. (2003)) (discussing closure as an essential element of storytelling).
12. As Robert Cover observed, “every narrative is insistent in its demand for its prescriptive
point, its moral.” Robert Cover, “The Supreme Court 1982 Term, Foreword: Nomos
and Narrative,” 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 5 (1983).
13. See generally Patricia Ewick and Susan Silbey, The Common Place of Law: Stories from
Everyday Life (Chicago. University of Chicago Press, 1998) (discussing grand narratives
of justice).
14. Jarecki hints at this possibility in the film, by giving significant screen time to Debbie
Nathan, a freelance journalist who has devoted many years to exposing the injustices of
the day care sex abuse cases. See e.g. Nathan, supra note 1. Nathan, in the film, expli-
citly places the Friedman prosecutions in the context of the day care panics of the
1980’s, and describes the Friedman investigation as a moral panic.
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of moral panic as a frame for understanding what went wrong in the Friedman
cases, and as a heuristic for understanding how justice is derailed and what
can be done to address the problem. I will ultimately conclude that the
concept of moral panic is useful because it reminds us of the cultural contin-
gency of notions of criminal justice and criminal deviance. Nevertheless, the
concept has limitations that render it inadequate to address the hurdles to
justice encountered in the Friedman cases. Most prominently, the concept is
hindered by its retrospective nature. Like the question of guilt or innocence,
the notion of moral panic is backward-looking, and therefore not well suited
to addressing the prospective question of how the justice system can be
reformed to dismantle ongoing, systemic hurdles to criminal justice.
A better way to understand the film is as a cautionary tale about dys-
functional systems, both familial and legal.15 The film’s refusal to present us
with a coherent story of guilt or innocence, good or evil, justice done or
justice derailed, will disturb not only those who find indeterminacy threat-
ening, but also those who believe the film should have weighed in (either
pro or con) on the outcome of the Friedman prosecutions. Yet Capturing the
Friedmans’ most powerful lessons are inseparable from this refusal. The film
offers a searing indictment of the legal system’s difficulties seeking justice
when caught in the grip of fear, revulsion, prejudice and inexorable public
pressure. These difficulties cast doubt on the legal system’s ability to com-
petently determine the Friedmans’ guilt or innocence, and they need to be
faced whether or not the Friedmans did what they were accused of doing.
The film approaches the legal system as a complex organism consisting
of multiple institutional actors. We observe, listening to investigators, pros-
ecutors, defense lawyers, judges, judicial clerks, defendants, victims and
victims’ families, that many of their differences in perspective are to some
extent inevitable, given their varying roles.16 Jarecki’s approach conveys
something essential about systemic dysfunction: that it is often the result of
the acts of numerous individuals, each acting in good faith rather than with
malevolent intent. To convey this insight on film is a considerable achieve-
ment; neither systemic wrongdoing nor moral complexity is very filmic.17
Stories of complex bureaucratic dysfunction confound the insistent narra-
tive demand for “uncomplicated villains who have deliberately done bad
things to good people.”18 The legal actors in this drama on the whole seem
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15. Much of the film focuses on the painful dynamics of the Friedman family, and although
these dynamics both exacerbate and are exacerbated by Arnold and Jesse’s legal prob-
lems, they are not the focus of this discussion.
16. This is not to suggest that role entirely determines perspective; the film depicts varying
perspectives among investigators, among victims, and, most powerfully, among mem-
bers of the defendants’ family.
17. Patricia Ewick and Susan S. Silbey, “Subversive Stories and Hegemonic Tales: Toward a
Sociology of Narrative,” 29 L & Soc’y Rev. 197, 206–208 (1995); Susan Bandes, “Em-
pathy, Narrative and Victim Impact Statements,” 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 361, 382–88 (1996)
(discussing counter-narratives that violate the rules of storytelling in order to unsettle
conventional assumptions).
18. Susan Bandes, “Patterns of Injustice: Police Brutality in the Courts,” 47 Buff. L. Rev. 1275,
1328 (1999). See also Susan Bandes, “Not Enough Blame to Go Around: Reflections on
Requiring Purposeful Government Misconduct,” 68 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1195 (2003).
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bent on seeking justice, on doing the right thing, though their views of what
justice requires diverge markedly. Thus the film raises the disquieting pos-
sibility that justice may be derailed though no one is precisely to blame, at
least in the simplistic way in which blame is often portrayed.
In this paper I want to explore the tension, so well encapsulated in Cap-
turing the Friedmans, between the dynamics of moral panic – the dramatic
retrospective narrative of widespread injustice – and the dynamics of the
everyday failures of justice that pervade our criminal courts. Moral panic is
a phenomenon worth exploring. It occurs in a particular societal moment,
and it is fueled by a set of exceedingly salient emotions. Its sociological
roots have been well explored.19 My focus will be on its emotional aspects;
the ways in which the legal system becomes a party to the disgust, fear and
hysteria on which it is based.20 At the same time, the concept of moral
panic may be a dangerous diversion from far more pervasive problems.
My broader concern is with what it shares with other instances of injustice,
rather than what makes it unique.
I. Moral Panic and the Day Care Sexual Abuse Cases
The problems that Capturing the Friedmans reveals are neither sui generis nor
universal; yet the film does not explicitly place them in broader perspec-
tive. It sets out instead to provide a meticulous dissection of the dynamics
of the particular situation. However, as I will argue shortly, placing the
Friedman cases in the context of the larger day care sexual abuse panic
helps explain the cases themselves, and also sheds light on both the narra-
tive structure and the rhetorical power of the film. In this part, I will exam-
ine the moral panic construct in depth. As I will argue, the construct, up to
a point, well captures the dynamics Jarecki seeks to depict.
“Moral panic” is a term with roots in sociology which has more recently
become part of common parlance. An early and often-cited definition of
the term appears in Stanley Cohen’s classic sociological study of the British
Mods and Rockers in the mid-sixties.21 Cohen explains the term as follows:
Societies appear to be subject, every now and then, to periods of moral
panic. A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to
become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is
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19. One of the acknowledged classics in this field is Stuart Hall, Chas Critcher, Tony Jefferson,
John Clarke and Brian Roberts, Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and Order
(Teaneck: Holmes & Meier Publishers 1978). Other highly respected sociological works
on moral panic in general, and the child sexual abuse panic of the 1980’s in particular,
are cited throughout this article.
20. In my article “Patterns of Injustice: Police Brutality in the Courts,” supra note 18, I
explore in detail the cultural assumptions that undergird judicial tendencies to discern a
pattern among incidents in some situations but not in others, and indeed to disaggregate
incidents that are arguably connected in some circumstances.
21. Stanley Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics (1972) (Oxford: Routledge, 30th anniversary
edn. (2002)).
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presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media;
the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and
other right-thinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce
their diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved or (more
often) resorted to; the condition then disappears, submerges or deteri-
orates and becomes more visible . . . Sometimes the panic passes over
and is forgotten, except in folklore and collective memory; at other
times it has more serious and long-lasting repercussions and might
produce such changes as those in legal and social policy or even in the
way the society conceives itself.22
The concept of moral panic offers a means of ordering seemingly discon-
nected incidents and placing them in a coherent framework, in the hope
that the framework will generate a useful set of lessons or principles. Soci-
ologists search for societal explanations for the explosions of concern that
arise from time to time about some form of perceived deviance. Examples
include Cohen’s Folk Devils and Moral Panics, which explores the reaction to
the Mods and Rockers during the early counterculture in Britain; the clas-
sic work Policing the Crisis: which analyses the hysteria surrounding “mug-
gings” in Britain in the early 1970’s,23 more recent work on the hysteria
surrounding “wilding,” in New York,24 and numerous works, both in the
United States and in the United Kingdom, about the widespread panic
over day care sexual abuse in the 1980’s.25
Whether the framework is a useful ordering device is a matter of con-
tinued debate, significantly complicated by the difficulties in pinning down
exactly what constitutes a moral panic. My focus is on determining whether
the concept offers anything to legal reformers, and a number of the defini-
tional ambiguities bear on this question.
One contribution of the moral panic construct is its reminder that law is
not made or enforced in a cultural, historical and social vacuum. For ex-
ample Policing the Crisis sets out to explore, not so much the social causes of
mugging, but “why British society reacts to mugging, in the extreme way it
does, at that precise historical juncture – the early 1970’s.”26 Similarly, as I
will discuss shortly, the interlocking child sexual abuse panics of the 1980’s
might be better understood by viewing them in historical context, as part of
an era of conservative ascendance, and more specifically, as part of a back-
lash against loosening sexual mores, feminism, homosexuality and other
perceived threats to the established order. Moral panics, in this theory, are a
means of reasserting hegemony in the face of behaviors that seem to
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22. Id at 9.
23. Policing the Crisis, supra note 19.
24. Michael Welch, Eric A. Price and Nana Yankey, “Moral Panic Over Youth Violence:
Wilding and the Manufacture of Menace in the Media,” 34 Youth & Society 3–30
(September 2002).
25. See e.g. Beatrix Campbell, Unofficial Secrets: Child Sexual Abuse—The Cleveland Case (London:
Virago Press 1988); Nathan, supra note 1; Rabinowitz, supra note 2.
26. Policing the Crisis, supra note 19 at Introduction vii.
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threaten “disintegration of the social order.”27 Order is restored through the
mechanism of defining certain threatening behaviors as deviant, demoniz-
ing the behaviors and their practitioners, and cordoning these practitioners
off from civil society.28 Thus the theory is useful both in focusing attention
on why particular behaviors seem so threatening at particular times, and in
reminding us that the sense of imminent threat may later dissipate.
Unfortunately, that knowledge seems most usable in retrospect.29 The
retrospective view might permit policymakers, with some distance, to
rethink laws and policies adopted in haste, though examples of such
rethinking do not come readily to mind.30 An even more utopian hope is
that policymakers might learn from history, and in future resist the tempta-
tion to adopt a quick fix, or even build in structures to ensure due deliber-
ation. But in the midst of a moral panic, we may not find that historical or
sociological insights offer much help. One aspect of a moral panic is that its
concerns seem, in the moment, immediate and real. In short, how can we
know we are in the midst of a moral panic in time to correct for it?31
A second problem is that the concept of moral panic denotes a time-
limited, volatile and unexpected phenomenon, and, as I will discuss later, this
may simply be descriptively inaccurate. Indeed, the term is sometimes used
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27. Id at Introduction viii.
28. There are varying views on how the panics are generated, and for what purposes.
Cohen saw them as the product of societal or cultural forces; Goode and Ben-Yehuda
viewed them as engineered by the deliberate acts of ruling elites; whereas Hall et al
tended to agree that they are generated by elites, but did not impute cynical motives to
those elites. See Cohen, supra note 21 (introduction at xxiii); Goode and Ben-Yehuda,
supra note 4 at 127; Policing the Crisis, supra note 19 at 220. Historian Arnold Hunt also
discusses proponents of a grassroots theory, who believe that moral panics are in fact
accurate reflections of the conditions in which people live, and thus ought not to be
labeled panics at all. Arnold Hunt, “‘Moral Panic’ and Moral Language in the Media,”
48 British Journal of Sociology 629, 636–637 (1997) (discussing grassroots theory).
29. Not that hindsight guarantees clarity. The causes of the Salem Witch Trials, for example,
are still being debated. See e.g. Frances Hill, A Delusion of Satan: The Full Story of the
Salem Witch Trials (New York: Doubleday 1995) (arguing that the causes included eco-
nomic woes and a brutally cold winter); Mary Beth Norton, In the Devil’s Snare: The Salem
Witchcraft Crisis of 1692 (New York: Knopf, 2002) (arguing that the trials must be placed
in a religious, political and military context, and particularly in the context of the Indian
Wars and the religious interpretation of those wars).
30. See e.g. The Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Pro-
gram, 42 U.S. C. A. 14071 (2003) (popularly known as Megan’s Law; passed in reaction
to a high profile child abduction); and Public Law 109–3 (2005) (creating a new source
of federal jurisdiction to enable Terry Schiavo’s parents to challenge the decision to
remove her from life support). See also the USA Patriot Act, PL 107–56 (2001). As an
editorial in the New York Times noted, “The Patriot Act was passed in haste, in the angst-
filled days after the September 11th attacks, with some lawmakers candidly admitting
they never read the details.” The editorial notes that rather than allow its more contro-
versial provisions to expire, lawmakers “seem bent on making it worse.” “Patriot Act
Redux, and in the Dark,” New York Times at A22, June 1, 2005.
31. But see Angela McRobbie and Sarah L. Thornton, “Rethinking ‘Moral Panic’ for Multi-
Mediated Social Worlds,” 46 British Journal of Sociology 559, 566 (1995). The authors
argue that by the 1990’s, interest groups and lobbies had mobilized to intervene in
moral panics as they were unfolding, seeking to “respond instantly to the media demon-
ization of the group they represent, and to provide information and analysis designed to
counter this representation.”
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to describe more diffuse and longstanding phenomena. For example, the
authors of Policing the Crisis describe a period beginning in the early 1960’s
with a discrete moral panic over the Mods and the Rockers, developing into
a whole series of moral panics occurring in quick succession in the late 1960’s
(drugs, hippies, pornography and others), and culminating in the 1970’s in “a
general panic about social order.”32 Once the term is used to describe such
longstanding, broad-based phenomena, it arguably begins to shade into a
more general view of moral panics as cyclical phenomena that are “part and
parcel of the human condition.”33 As some scholars have commented in ref-
erence to Policing the Crisis, such analyses are not so much about the soci-
ology of deviance as they are works of general cultural studies.34
Of course, these two views need not be mutually exclusive. It is sensible
to assume that moral panics are part of the human condition, and yet each
individual instance has its own historical and social triggers. Nevertheless,
if the concept of moral panic simply describes an endemic historical cycle
of change and backlash, it is not clear what it adds to the conversation.
The final ambiguity goes to the core of the concept’s definition. The phrase
“moral panic” appears to contain an evaluative judgment, but it is not clear
whether the term is necessarily pejorative. It might connote a reaction to a
non-existent problem, an inappropriately strong reaction to a problem that
does exist, or simply any reaction to an emotionally fraught problem. In
short, it is ambiguous whether the term conveys a judgment about the truth
and proportionality of the concerns that engender the panic.35
Consider that the pedophilia scandal in the Catholic Church has been
dubbed, by some, a moral panic, despite the recognition that many of the
accusations are grounded in fact.36 There is a fear that innocent priests may
be wrongly accused37 and that the good works of the Church will be over-
shadowed by the scandal. Do these valid concerns render the scandal a
moral panic, or is the more pressing moral issue in that situation the his-
tory of institutional denial and absence of moral outrage? The longstand-
ing denial of a pattern of police abuse and torture in Chicago tells a similar
story of a stubborn refusal to make or act upon connections, despite story
after story of horrific wrongdoing.38 As these stories suggest, if moral panic
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32. Policing the Crisis, supra note 19 at 222 (emphasis in the original).
33. Hunt, supra note 28, quoting the preface to Goode and Ben-Yehuda, Moral Panics: The
Social Construction of Deviance (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994).
34. McRobbie and Thornton, supra note 31 at 563; expressing this opinion and noting the
trend to locate Policing the Crisis within a cultural studies or neo-Marxist perspective.
35. As Arnold Hunt notes, Stanley Cohen remains neutral on the policy implications of the
phenomenon he identifies, whereas the authors of Policing the Crisis “incorporate in their
definition of a moral panic the notion of an irrational or unjustified response.” Hunt,
supra note 28 at 634.
36. See Religioustolerance.org/clergy (last visited September 15, 2004); Benjamin Shepard,
“In Search of a Winning Script: Panic vs. Institutional Denial,” in Sexualities (Sage Publi-
cations, 2003).
37. See e.g. Alexander Cockburn, “Back to Salem,” The Nation at 12, March 7, 2005 (liken-
ing child sexual abuse prosecution of defrocked priest Father Paul Shanley, which was
based largely on recovered memory testimony, to a witch hunt).
38. Bandes, “Patterns of Injustice,” supra note 18.
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is an evil, so too is the failure to connect the dots, to call abuse by its right-
ful name, and to act decisively to end abuse. What, then, separates a moral
panic from a legitimate response to an alarming pattern of wrongdoing?
For legal policymakers concerned both about whether justice was served in
individual cases and about how to respond to systemic problems, this ques-
tion is of considerable importance.
Ultimately I will argue for a more forward-looking approach that permits
us to identify threats to the administration of justice before they occur. Never-
theless, despite the questions I’ve raised about the utility of the concept of
moral panic, the concept does offer some insight into how justice might fail.
Each of the crises identified by sociologists shares certain characteristics that
tend to be incompatible with deliberative justice. Certain behaviors are not
merely identified as criminal, or as on the rise, but as threatening to the fabric
of society. Those thought to engage in such behaviors are seen as not merely
criminal, but evil, dehumanized; the embodiment of all we fear.39 The media
and other institutions take an active role in disseminating this story of good
and evil; civilization and chaos. Punishing the wrongdoer becomes a sym-
bolic act of fealty to civilized norms; the failure to punish is a betrayal of those
norms. These characteristics define the day care sexual abuse scandal of the
1980’s, and we can observe, in microcosm, the means by which they define
the Friedman cases, at least as Jarecki’s film depicts them.
II. The Day Care Sexual Abuse Panic
The day care sexual abuse panic was, more accurately, a set of overlapping
panics over abuse of children by day care workers, by rings of pedophiles and
child pornographers, and by satanic cults. Thus it contained a strand of fan-
tastical accusations: the Satanic ritual abuse strand. It also contained a wholly
conjectural strand positing an organized nationwide ring of child pornog-
raphers. These strands have been discredited.40 Child sexual abuse, pedo-
philia, and child pornography, on the other hand, are real and serious crimes.
Here the problem was one of disproportion. The day care panic was com-
prised of a series of high-profile cases, including the case of the Amiraults of
the Fells Acres School in Malden, Massachusetts, the Bakersfield, California
cases and the McMartin Preschool case in Manhattan Beach, California, the
Little Rascals Day Care Center case in Edenton, North Carolina, and numer-
ous others. These cases implicated many hundreds of suspects. For example,
in the Bakersfield cases eight sex rings were “uncovered” in the early 1980’s,
just one of which (the “Satanic Church” case) implicated sixty adults.41
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39. Policing the Crisis, supra note 19 at 133.
40. Nathan and Snedeker, supra note 1 at 1 (citing Gail S. Goodman et al., Characteristics
and Sources of Allegations of Ritualistic Child Abuse (Washington D.C.: National Center on
Child Abuse and Neglect, 1994) reporting federal governmental study determining that
reports of satanic conspiracies and organized incursions into day care were unfounded).
41. Mary deYoung, “The Devil Goes to Day Care: McMartin and the Making of a Moral
Panic,” 20 Journal of American Culture 19 (1997).
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The day care abuse scandals, in the harsh light of hindsight, were based
largely on non-existent crimes. As mentioned above, some of these crimes
defied belief from the beginning. In other cases, a plausible initial com-
plaint against a single individual was lodged,42 and the situation spiraled
out of control from there – with accusations and suspects multiplying. In
the aftermath of these initial complaints, scores of day care workers with
no prior records were vilified, convicted, and sent to serve decades in
prison. Thus the illusion of a full-scale crime wave was essentially fabri-
cated from a series of exaggerated or nonexistent events.
Different stories resonate at different cultural junctures. There is a rich
sociological literature seeking to identify the confluence of cultural and
societal factors that led to this particular series of panics, in all their permu-
tations (for example satanic ritual abuse discovered through recovered
memory; international child pornography rings) to which I cannot do just-
ice here. In the 1970’s and early 1980’s, there was a growing belief (whether
or not empirically grounded is controversial)43 that child abuse was more
prevalent than previously thought. The locus of much of the suspicion was
day care centers and preschools. Some sociologists identify a growing con-
cern about day care – the contracting out of previously familial childcare
duties – as the root of the panic.44 In this view, the moral panic signaled
concern about a breakdown of moral consensus in the face of feminism,
homosexuality, and loosening sexual constraints in general.45 Others argue
that the panic was the product of the child advocate frame, which sought to
correct for “decades of ignorance and rejection of children’s stories of
abuse.”46 These factors were coupled with certain assumptions that had a
powerful influence on whose stories would be believed. One assumption,
which remains controversial, is that recovered memories of child sexual
abuse are both widespread and reliable.47 Another, which has been shown
to be flawed, was that children did not lie; or at least, they did not lie when
claiming to have been abused. (The counter-assumption, that children who
deny abuse are repressing it, has also proved to be flawed). In part, this
belief arose from the paucity of serious study of children’s conceptions 
of truth. In part, it stemmed from a laudable determination to at last take
children’s victimization seriously.
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42. John Johnson, “Kids Don’t Lie,” Los Angeles Times 16, August 10, 2003.
43. Margaret Talbot, “Against Innocence,” The New Republic 38, March 15, 1999 (suggesting
that though the data are subject to varying interpretations, it is likely that the incidence
of child abuse decreased in the 1980’s).
44. See e.g. deYoung, supra note 41 at 1–2; Nathan & Snedeker, supra note 1 at 4.
45. Hunt, supra note 28 at 635.
46. Susan J. Sachsenmaier, “Investigating Child Sexual Abuse Allegations: Do Experts
Agree on Anything?” www.aaets.org/arts (The American Academy of Experts in Trau-
matic Stress homepage; last visited September 15, 2004.)
47. See e.g. John O. Beahrs, John J. Cannel and Thomas G. Gutheil, “Delayed Traumatic
Recall in Adults: A Synthesis with Legal, Clinical, and Forensic Recommendations”, 24
Bull Am Acad Psychiatry Law 45 (1996) (noting that the topic of delayed recall remains
highly polarized both in forensic psychiatry and in society, and suggesting that polariza-
tion arises not only from competing values but from definitional confusions).
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III. Capturing the Friedmans
Capturing the Friedmans refers to little of this historical and social context.
Instead, it takes the audience, step by step, through the events leading up to
the guilty pleas and incarceration of Arnold and Jesse Friedman for multiple
counts of child sexual abuse; an escalating scenario that, viewed in retro-
spect, shares many of the characteristics of the day care sexual abuse panic
that was at that time sweeping the United States and the United Kingdom.
The Friedman cases were entirely initiated by the legal system. There
had been no complaints from children or their parents about child sexual
abuse. Though Arnold and Jesse Friedman would soon be charged with
more than 300 counts of child sexual abuse, the investigation began as a
federal sting operation against Arnold for receiving child pornography
through the US mail. Arnold, it emerged, was a pedophile. Federal agents
found child pornography in a search of his home. They also found a list of
the children who had attended Arnold’s after-school computer class over
the last several years. The federal agents notified Great Neck police of the
results of their search, and warned them that the computer students might
be victims of abuse.48 The police began an abuse investigation. Just as the
federal agents had apparently assumed abuse, the police appeared to
approach their own investigation with a certainty that abuse had occurred.
As one of the detectives stated at a public screening of the film,49 “We knew
going in certain things had happened. We knew that.”50
At this point, one of the hallmark characteristics of a moral panic came
into play. To set off the collective reaction essential to a moral panic, the
story must be told and retold. Its moral dimensions must be hyperbolized
through role amplification: with the accused becoming more evil, the child-
ren more innocent, the parents and prosecutors more heroic in each
retelling. In a child sexual abuse case, merely spreading the news of the
accusation is generally enough to trigger this reaction, as one of the princi-
pal investigators on the Friedman cases, Detective DeGarasso, noted in the
film. Here the police began interviewing scores of children and their par-
ents. The film conveys the impression that these interviews were quite
directive in nature. One of the detectives interviewed stated that when
questioning the children “you don’t give them an option, really.”51 His
method was to let the children know that police already knew abuse had
occurred. Suspected victims and parents interviewed in the film confirmed
that police had taken this approach, and also described police as question-
ing the children repeatedly until they received the answers they wanted.
48. Silvergate, supra note 6.
49. The screening took place in Great Neck, New York. Scenes from the screening appear
on Disc Two of the Capturing the Friedmans dvd.
50. Capturing the Friedmans Disc 2. See also Affidavit of Andrew Jarecki in support of Jesse
Friedman’s motion to vacate conviction in the case of The People of New York v. Jesse Friedman,
Indictments Nos. 67104, 67430 and 68783, County Court of the State of New York, Nassau
County, January 5, 2004.
51. Capturing the Friedmans Disc 1.
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Police attended community meetings and talked frequently to the media.
Parents, understandably, were in an uproar. In journalist Debbie Nathan’s
description in the film, Great Neck had now identified itself as a victimized
community, and anyone who was not a victim was an outsider. Thus the
police, with the help of media, parents, and community, began to multiply
their list of alleged victims. Ultimately, their entire case, consisting of hun-
dreds of counts alleging specific acts of child sexual abuse, would rest on
the statements they obtained from computer students.
The details of the police interviews cannot be known with certainty,
since no written, aural or videotaped record of these interviews was ever
produced by police. Particularly since the interviews are the sole evidence
in the case apart from the guilty pleas, the film’s depiction of the interview
techniques and the interviewees is controversial. In the film, several of the
interviewees and their parents describe their memory of the questioning,52
and their memories are generally quite consistent.53
The Friedmans did not have a jury trial. The story of why they pled guilty
is sad and complex. Both Arnold and Jesse were subjected to intense pres-
sure not to go to trial. It seems likely that Arnold pled out of a sense of shame
at his own pedophilia and what it had wrought, and in order to save Jesse.
But he did so without making a deal to cut Jesse loose, leaving Jesse to face
trial as the teaching assistant of a man who had admitted, in a televised hear-
ing, to multiple acts of child abuse.54 Both Jesse’s mother, Elaine Friedman,
and Jesse’s attorney, Peter Panero, stated in the film that presiding judge
Boklan threatened Jesse through his lawyer that if he went to trial and lost,
she would sentence him consecutively on every count in his 300 count
indictment. After Jesse pled guilty, she sentenced him to the maximum
allowable sentence of six to eighteen years and asked the parole board, in a
televised proceeding, to consider Jesse a dangerous criminal and to hold him
for the full eighteen years of his sentence. Jesse was paroled in 2001, seven
years after his eligibility date, because he refused to reiterate his guilt during
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52. See e.g. affidavits filed by several of the interviewees and their parents, including
Richard Tilker, Brian Tilker, Ralph Georgalis, in the aftermath of the film, as well as the
transcript of an interview surreptitiously recorded by one child’s mother during the ini-
tial investigation. Capturing the Friedmans Disc 2.
53. A similar description emerges when a legal advisor to the film interviews one of the
detectives, Detective Jones, during the making of the film. Detective Jones recounted
the following: One child was interviewed fifteen times, in sessions lasting as long as four
hours. He repeatedly denied being abused. The detective explained why she kept going
back: “The boy would let us sit with him in his bedroom for hours, and he’d bring up
every topic except sexual abuse. We played games with him, he showed us his com-
puter, he’d do anything to avoid the subject. For a long time he had nothing to say, but
we knew. On one occasion the boy jumped up and down, screaming ‘I have nothing to
tell you! Nothing happened!’ But by then we already knew, so we kept coming back
after that until he told us. On the fifteenth visit, the detectives told the boy’s mother that
they were going to stay ‘as long as it takes, that we were not going to leave until he told
us. We were prepared to stay all night if need be.’ The boy finally stated that he had
been abused. Asked why it took the child fifteen interviews to make the accusation, the
detective explained that he ‘had suffered tremendous trauma and had kept it deep
inside. I drew it out again,’ she said. After that visit, the detectives did not return. Affi-
davit of David Kuhn, id.
54. See Silvergate, supra note 6, critiquing the plea arrangements.
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required sex offender classes.55 He currently remains under strict parole con-
ditions. Arnold Friedman died in prison, an apparent suicide.
The film adopts a stance of impartiality on the question of guilt or inno-
cence, for which it has been both praised and criticized. Critics argue that
Jarecki deliberately kept the film on the fence for reasons of aesthetics or
marketability, and that this was either indefensible while Jesse Friedman’s
unjust conviction stood,56 or indefensible in light of the crime the Friedmans
had committed and the film’s power to cause further pain to the victims.57
Defenders argue that the film’s artistry lies in its demonstration of subjectivity,
of the inability of the legal system to capture the absolute truth.
A documentary that raises questions about the justice of a legal proceed-
ing, even one that purports to take no position on the answer to those ques-
tions, creates an infinite regress of sorts.58 Jennifer Mnookin, in a splendid
article about such films (and in particular about two HBO films about the
trial of three Memphis teenagers for the murder of three eight-year-old boys),
notes that these films “themselves construct a kind of parallel evidentiary
record.”59 Film viewers are asked to judge the evidence anew.60 And film
viewers, like jurors, are presented with a spectacle that has been produced;
a staged depiction of an event in which some aspects have been high-
lighted, others minimized, and still others excluded entirely. To accept the
film’s version of events as superior to the law’s version, as she puts it:
requires us to accept [the film] as a substitute, or supplementary, trial,
which in turn requires us to accept the validity of its depiction of the
proof presented, even though the film invites doubt about whether
such depictions ever give us the “whole” story.61
Like legal proceedings, such films raise questions about the truth value of var-
ious forms of evidence, legal and filmic, and how it ought to be evaluated.
They provide, not a source of unmediated truth, but a depiction of the forces
shaping competing versions of truth. They also provide a vivid reminder that
in the legal system, tremendous consequences hinge on the outcome of the
competition. As Linda Williams observed in an article on such films:
The recognition that documentary access to [the real] is strategic and
contingent does not require a retreat to a Rashomon universe of
55. Silvergate, id.
56. See e.g. Silvergate, id; Susan Davis, “Questions the Documentary Never Asks: Framing
the Friedmans,” Counterpunch, November 29, 2003.
57. Waxman, supra note 6.
58. See Law on the Screen (Sarat, Douglas and Umphrey, eds. Palo Alto: Stanford University
Press (2005)), introduction at 5 (discussing the “doubling up, or thickening, of narrative
space that arises from depiction of courtroom proceedings on film).
59. Jennifer L. Mnookin, “Reproducing a Trial” at 157, in Law on the Screen (Sarat, Douglas
and Umphrey, eds, 2005).
60. Law on the Screen, supra note 58 at 14 (explaining that viewers of films about legal trials
are “jurified” on a number of different levels.)
61. Mnookin, supra note 59 at 158.
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undecidabilities. This recognition can lead, rather, to a remarkable
awareness of the conditions under which it is possible to intervene in
the political and cultural construction of truths which, while not guar-
anteed, nevertheless matter as the narratives by which we live.62
Capturing the Friedmans seeks to confound the desire for certainty and
closure. Jarecki unsettles his audience each time it feels it is closing in on
the truth, leaving it in a state of anxiety at the lack of resolution. Filmic crim-
inal cases are usually resolved by a climactic trial, whereas the Friedmans
both pled guilty. The film reveals the guilty pleas as highly problematic or
even suspect, depriving the audience of the comfort that normally comes
from hearing the wrongdoer publicly accept responsibility.63 Not only does
the film fail to give its audience closure on the question of the Friedmans’
guilt or innocence, it has managed to open old wounds, rekindle debate
among those affected by the case, and possibly reopen the case itself.64 In a
series of complex feedback loops, the film itself has become so intertwined
in the case that it is not always clear where “the film” leaves off and “the
case” begins (or ends, for that matter). Witness interviews and documents
uncovered by Jarecki (only some of which are presented in the film) have
triggered an effort to reopen the case.65 The film itself has triggered reactions
and some additional revelations by its principals. Much of this additional
material appears on Disc 2,66 ironically entitled “Outside the Frame,” which,
for those introduced to Capturing the Friedmans on video, is effectively part of
the film.
Thus the film demonstrates that the easy closure promised by the
Friedmans’ guilty pleas was deceptive; there was much more to the story.
The film itself neither promises nor delivers closure. Its aftermath raises
the specter of endless rounds of testimony appearing on web sites, in film
reviews, in articles, all of it unmediated and unconstrained by legal stand-
ards of proof or admissibility. Thus it raises, perhaps unintentionally, the
question of whether legal closure is, though imperfect, better than the alter-
native of endless unmediated disputation.
Or perhaps closure, in the sense of a definitive statement of guilt or inno-
cence, is simply not important to the film’s message. The film may want to
depict the dynamics of a justice system gone awry in the face of commu-
nity hysteria. If so, Capturing the Friedmans finds itself in a predicament. If it
is a film about moral panic, and if moral panic connotes an inappropriate
reaction, then it matters whether Jesse and Arnold are pedophiles who
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62. Linda Williams, “Mirrors without Memories: Truth, History, and the New Documen-
tary,” 46 Film Quarterly 9, 14 (1993).
63. Peter Brooks, Troubling Confessions: Speaking Guilt in Law and Literature at 9 (Chicago.
University of Chicago Press, 2000).
64. Jesse Friedman asserts in his Motion to Vacate Conviction that the film gave him some
hope that he might overturn his conviction, and that it also provided access to former
child witnesses who would testify on his behalf, as well as to new exculpatory evidence.
65. Motion to Vacate Conviction, supra note 47.
66. Capturing the Friedmans Disc two.
293-319 LCH-076384.qxd  24/4/07  12:25 PM  Page 306
The Lessons of Capturing the Friedmans 307
abused numerous young boys in their home. If the film is truly on the fence
about this question, a moral panic storyline is unlikely to gain much trac-
tion. Yet this does seem to be the implicit story, and it succeeds largely
because the film strongly signals its belief in Jesse Friedman’s innocence.
To the extent true ambiguity exists, it centers mainly on Arnold Friedman:
loving father, beloved teacher, admitted pedophile.67
The film signals its belief in Jesse’s innocence in several ways. Most
prominently, the film’s narrator, in keeping with the aesthetic of impartial-
ity, rarely intrudes. The film offers little overall commentary; preferring to
allow the principals to speak. Yet when it does offer cultural commentary,
that commentary is accorded privileged status. Unlike the calibrated pre-
sentation of the case itself, which uses starkly differing perspectives to desta-
bilize the notion of an authoritative voice, the presentation of the theory of
moral panic is accorded several indicia of authority. Debbie Nathan, a free-
lance journalist who has devoted many years to exposing the injustices of
the day care sexual abuse panic, is given significant airtime. She is presented
as professional, attractive and trustworthy. Her role is to place the Friedman
cases in the context of the day care abuse cases. She speaks throughout the
film of the hysteria around the issue of child sexual abuse, and its application
to the cases. She pronounces the charges against the Friedmans “implausible.”
She is permitted to comment critically on the interviews with some of the
principals, for example reminding the audience that one detective’s memory
of a foot high stack of child pornography around the house was fantasy. Her
commentary on the phenomenon of moral panic and its application to the
day care sexual abuse cases is left unchallenged.
The film also signals its position through the all-important interviews with
the alleged victims and their parents. As the film establishes, the testimony
of these victims constituted the entire case against the Friedmans. There was
no physical evidence. With one exception, every victim or parent of a victim
interviewed in the film claims that nothing happened, that the charges were
ludicrous, or (in two cases), that they themselves had not been truthful when
they claimed to have been abused. Following footage of the two witnesses
who recant on screen, the director informs the audience that their testimony
led to multiple counts in the indictments against Arnold and Jesse. The sole
victim who continues to claim abuse is presented quite differently. He is
splayed on a sofa in a strangely erotic, even tawdry position, bathed in
shadow. The off-screen interviewer asks a question that suggests an import-
ant discrepancy in his testimony. His response is convoluted and con-
tradictory. It also comes out, in both his on-screen testimony and Debbie
Nathan’s, that he had no memory of the abuse until he was hypnotized.
67. On Disc 2, the director declares, in an interview with Charlie Rose, that he believes in
Jesse Friedman’s innocence. He reveals a more complicated attitude toward Arnold,
suggesting (in reference to Arnold’s admitted acts of pedophilia) that he had been con-
victed of the “wrong felonies.” However, he made clear his opinion that the case had
been poorly handled, noting that if it had been a shoplifting case, it would have been
thrown out “because the police work was so bad.”
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Nathan comments that this is an improper investigative technique, prone to
creating false memories.
The film throws viewers off balance by following much of this material
with an extended section on Arnold’s pedophilia. Elaine Friedman, Peter
Panero, Debbie Nathan and Arnold’s brother all weigh in on the topic,
revealing evidence that Arnold did engage in acts of pedophilia, though
not the acts of which he stood accused. The audience is left with a queasy
and unsettled feeling about Arnold, exacerbated by Arnold’s own behavior
in the home movies that make up a large part of the film. Arnold does not
act like a man outraged at being falsely accused. He acts ashamed, reticent,
almost voiceless. Yet the treatment of Arnold serves mostly to highlight the
injustice to Jesse. Jarecki gives the last words of the film to Elaine Friedman.
She has doubted Arnold’s innocence throughout the film, since the initial
shock of learning of his pedophilia. The viewer is left with her last com-
ment, expressing her view that Arnold probably belongs in prison; he just
shouldn’t have taken Jesse with him.
In short, the film is not truly agnostic on the question of guilt or inno-
cence, and in this way it attempts to subtly finesse the question of whether
the Friedmans belong in the category of victims of a moral panic. But the
story Capturing the Friedmans tells about justice derailed need not hinge on
retrospective assessments of guilt or innocence, or on claims that such
assessments can be made with certainty. Placing the film in the larger con-
text of the day care sexual abuse panic of the 1980’s yields valuable insight
into the dynamics of a legal system caught in hysteria. It also models a cor-
rective for those dynamics; a way to ameliorate their effects in future cases.
The first step is to understand and address the common elements under-
lying such cases. Moral panics depend on role simplification and amplifica-
tion – on uncomplicatedly evil villains, and uncomplicatedly good heroes.
This film complicates and humanizes its characters, and renders the notion
of heroes and villains problematic. Moral panics offer a simple view of
motivation. This film helps us understand the multiple influences that ren-
der motivation so complex and mysterious.
Placing the interviews in historical context reveals that the tactics which
many of the former students and their parents described, with some cor-
roboration from detectives, were a hallmark of the child sexual abuse
investigations of the 1980’s. Children who claimed abuse were assumed 
to be telling the truth, based on firmly-held beliefs about children’s cogni-
tive development.68 Experts had a ready explanation for those children
who repeatedly denied abuse: the theory of child abuse accommodation
syndrome.69 “A child’s emphatic denial that anything had happened was in
fact proof that the child had been victimized. Denials of abuse were proof
[that the child was in] the suppression stage.”70 However, juries confronted
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68. Johnson, “Kids Don’t Lie,” supra note 39.
69. Dr. Roland Summit, “The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome,” 7 Child
Abuse and Neglect , 1983.
70. Rabinowitz, supra note 2 at 14.
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with videotapes of the interviews sometimes balked at the obvious manipu-
lation of children. Videotaped child testimony was a large factor in the
acquittal of the McMartin defendants. In the Friedman cases, as I men-
tioned above, there was no such documentation, and this lack of documen-
tation is itself a failure of the investigation.
Why did police fail to take (or turn over) notes of their interviews? Why
did they fail to seek physical examinations of the alleged victims?71 Accord-
ing to Jesse’s analysis of the charges, for example, police accepted allega-
tions that one boy had been raped 30 times during the first ten week
computer course, that he then re-enrolled for the advanced course and was
raped 41 more times. No evidence was presented that his parents noticed
any sign, physical or emotional, of this repeated rape. Why were police
unfazed by the failure of physical evidence to materialize (for example the
photographs of boys the Friedmans were charged with taking)? Interest-
ingly, when interviewed for the film years later, the investigators remained
committed to their initial version of events, and had in some respects re-
imagined the evidence to conform to this scenario.72 The film does not
depict the investigators as cynical, venal or even ambitious. It depicts them
as professionals who began their investigation with a fervent commitment
to a particular version of events, and a fervent determination to bring the
perpetrators to justice. Perhaps because of their certainty, they cut corners
in their investigation. Thoroughness is a frequent casualty of such cases.73
The film’s depiction of the investigators, like its depiction of the Friedmans,
deprives the audience of an unambiguous villain. In place of a villain, it
offers a deeper understanding about investigative excess. Sometimes it is
venal and deliberate.74 More often, particularly in cases like the child sex-
ual abuse investigations, it is less about bad faith than about good inten-
tions coupled with powerful emotions that can hijack a case.
Scott Turow, who was once a prosecutor, eloquently explains (in the con-
text of death penalty investigations):
[i]t is these extreme and repellent crimes that provoke the highest
emotions – anger, especially, even outrage – that in turn make rational
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71. Detectives explained their failure to do so as based on a desire to spare the children the
trauma of a physical exam, as Detective Garasso explained in Capturing the Friedmans
(Disc two). See also www.leadershipcouncil.org (last visited May 29, 2005), a website of
psychologists specializing in child molestation research, which cites approvingly the
decision not to subject the children to physical exams in the Friedman investigation.
72. For example, Detective Garasso commented in the film that “the most overwhelming
thing was the child pornography,” and confidently declared that police had found stacks
of pornography in full view throughout the house; though in fact they had found only
one such stack, hidden behind the living room piano. This memory comported with the
original theory of the case; that the Friedmans were working with a child pornography
ring.
73. James S. Liebman, “The Overproduction of Death,” 100 Columbia L Rev 2030, 2082–97
(2000).
74. Id at 2094 n160; Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, “Break Rules, Be Promoted,”
Chicago Tribune, January 14, 1999.
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deliberation problematic for investigators, prosecutors, judges and
juries. Under enormous pressure to solve these cases, police often
become prisoners of their own initial hunches. {The investigations are}
conducted in an atmosphere where primitive fears about unknown,
dangerous strangers imperil our sense of an orderly world.75
Although Turow’s comment might be read to suggest an opposition between
emotion and reason, it is better understood to suggest that certain emotions
may impede and distort the progress of a criminal prosecution. The phe-
nomenon of “heater cases”76 is well known; the appellation captures the
immediacy and intensity of the cases to which Turow refers. In these high
profile cases, tremendous emotion is generated by the public; not just
outrage but fear and the sense of an imbalance that must be righted as soon
as possible. These are the sorts of emotions that propel a rush to judgment if
not properly channeled. As legal scholar Oliver Goodenough observed:
Although some emotional content is probably inevitable and neces-
sary in reviewing criminal allegations, letting the quick, intuitive and
emotional impulse to punish dissipate before judgment and action take
place may lead to preferable results in a complex society. Lynching is a
quick phenomenon, ‘shot through’ with emotion.77
He is certainly correct that emotional content is inevitable;78 the question is
what sorts of emotion should be encouraged or discouraged in particular
circumstances, and how best to accomplish this regulation. Emotion that is
“quick and intuitive” plays an important role in our survival and thriving,79
but may not be best suited to deliberative judgments. Intuition can be chan-
neled or corrected in light of further information, and one function of the
criminal process is to slow down the action and to allow room for contem-
plation and correction. In heater cases, this often fails to occur. Instead, the
intensity of the initial reaction builds and infects the very institutions that
ought to ensure a more deliberative process.
Sexual abuse investigations elicit an additional set of powerful emotions:
a fierce protectiveness of children, an immense revulsion at the idea
that anyone might be capable of harming children in this way. Arnold’s
pedophilia emerges as one of the most significant facts of the Friedman
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75. Scott Turow, Ultimate Punishment: A Lawyer’s Reflections on Dealing with the Death Penalty
at 34 (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux (2003)).
76. Liebman, supra note 73 at 2078 n 137; Myron W. Orfield, Jr., “Deterrence, Perjury and
the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts,” 63 U. Colo.
L. Rev. 75 (1992).
77. Oliver Goodenough and Kristin Prehn, “A Neuroscientific Approach to Normative
Judgment in Law and Justice, Phil. Trans. Royal Society London 1709, 1719 (2004).
78. The Passions of Law, Introduction (Susan Bandes ed. (New York: New York University
Press (2000))
79. Anthony R. Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain, Ch. 6
(Biological Regulation and Survival, pp 114–126 (Harper Perennial (1995)).
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case. Not his acts of pedophilia, but his proclivity. As one critic noted about
the film: “There’s enormous tension between accounts of the crimes Arnold
seems likely to have committed80 (and for which he was not tried) and the
stories of impossible-seeming crimes for which he was imprisoned.”81 The
subtext of child pornography and pedophilia drives the actions of all the play-
ers in this tragedy, including the legal actors. Arnold was a member of 
a reviled group. In the sociology of moral panics, he was a “folk-devil,” “a
villain . . . in the morality play of evil versus good,” an “enemy of respectable,
law-abiding society,” whose behavior was seen as “harmful or threatening to
the values, interests, way of life, possibly the very existence, of the society.”82
In short, once an accused is demonized in this manner, he ceases to be merely
a fallible or flawed person and becomes the repository of our fears and
social anxieties. As the authors of Policing the Crisis put it “we turn against
him the full wrath of our indignation.”83 Arnold was treated as a monster,
not just by the lay public but by legal actors all down the line. Even Jesse’s
attorney felt he had license to express his disgust, on camera, toward
Arnold’s pedophilia.84
Disgust, as both William Miller and Martha Nussbaum have argued, is
of an entirely different character than anger or indignation. It is an emo-
tion that, as Miller said,
marks out moral matters for which we can have no compromise . . . 
It . . . [helps] define and locate the boundary separating our group from
their group, purity from pollution, the violable from the inviolable.85
Nussbaum similarly argues that disgust is an emotion we use to distance
people; to treat them as “monsters, in no way like ourselves,”86 and there-
fore not worthy of our understanding or compassion. Nussbaum views dis-
gust as more visceral than cognitive; as an emotion not susceptible to
reflection and reason. The disgust elicited by accusations like those leveled
at the Friedmans might well short-circuit judgment at an early stage. Once
the accused were marked as monsters, the sole imperative was to cordon
them off from the human community.
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80. In the film, Arnold admits to having inappropriate sexual contact with two young boys
unrelated to the computer class during a summer vacation. Neither ever came forward.
Debbie Nathan quotes a former computer student who recalled that during class Arnold
“used to give boys furtive pats on their clothed legs and butts,” but that the kids shrugged it
off as a mere nuisance. Debbie Nathan, “Complex Persecution,” The Village Voice at 30, 2003.
81. Davis, supra note 56.
82. Good and Ben-Yehuda, supra note 4 at 157.
83. Policing the Crisis, supra note 19 at 133.
84. In the film, Jesse’s attorney Peter Panero recounts a conversation while Arnold was in
prison, in which Arnold asked to move away from a father with a small boy on his lap,
because their interaction was exciting him sexually. Panero is emphatic about how dis-
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Dan Kahan, in response to Nussbaum, defends the role of disgust, argu-
ing that it signals a deep moral aversion to the conduct at issue.87 But it is
possible that this signaling function becomes part of the impediment to just-
ice in cases like those involving child sexual abuse, since it may override
the importance of ensuring individual justice. In Miller’s view, disgust does
some valuable work in highlighting proper objects of contempt and
loathing, but, as he eloquently puts it:
We also clip disgust’s wings by wisely subjecting the entire moral
regime to certain political and legal constraints that severely circum-
scribe the actions that can justifiably be taken in consequence of
moral judgment.88
It is when the “moral regime” overpowers the “legal constraints” that prob-
lems arise. As Wall Street Journal reporter Dorothy Rabinowitz explains,
this is exactly the situation triggered by a charge of child sexual abuse:
To take up for those falsely accused of sex abuse charges was to under-
mine the battle against child abuse; it was to betray children and all
other victims of sexual predators . . . {In such cases} the facts of a case
were simply irrelevant. What mattered was the message – that such
crimes were uniquely abhorrent and must be punished accordingly.89
Emotions like fear, outrage, anger and disgust, in situations like these, are
entirely human. The question is what the legal system can do to correct for
the excesses to which they lead. The crux of the moral panic dynamic is
that the legal system, in such cases, does not correct for them. It gets swept
up in them instead.
This dynamic is not confined to overzealous pretrial investigators. The
prosecution role is even more problematic. Prosecutors are officers of the
court whose role is to seek justice, rather than seek convictions. They
should, in an ideal world, put a brake on police overzealousness. Yet pros-
ecutors are not exempt from the disgust, outrage and anger evoked by
child sexual abuse, and, disturbingly, they are not necessarily exempt from
the tendency to conflate accusation with guilt. Rabinowitz, confronting the
issue whether prosecutors actually believed some of the more incredible
charges they brought in the day care cases, concluded that “the prosecu-
tors’ propensity to believe in the guilt of anyone accused of the crime of
child sex abuse was overwhelming.”90 Moreover, prosecutors are under
tremendous pressure to produce results in heater cases. The community
pressure to right a grievous wrong is directed first at the police, and then,
for the duration of the investigation and the trial process, full bore on the
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prosecution. High profile child sexual abuse cases, like death penalty cases,
have the power to make or break a prosecutor’s reputation and perhaps his
political career.91
Finally, there is the role of the trier of fact. Many of the day care abuse cases
were tried before juries. Rabinowitz was asked how jurors could believe some
of the bizarre testimony they heard in these cases, and she explained:
Let’s say you’re a juror and you’re in the midst of this huge tidal
wave of accusations. The media is playing and replaying the sound
of the parents saying how their children’s lives have been ruined and
the accused are portrayed as monsters and the prosecutor . . .
reminds the jurors {of} how brave these children are for coming
forward to tell their stories. How can you betray these children?92
As scholars of jury behavior have usefully noted, the problem in such cases
is not so much the reaction of jurors toward any particular parties in the
case, but the strong emotions evoked by the very fact of such a crime, or
the very fact that someone could commit it. Neil Vidmar calls this a prob-
lem of generic prejudice toward the type of crime or type of party, explain-
ing that for some jurors:
the mere fact that the defendant is charged with sexual assault
against a child will cause the juror to consider the defendant prob-
ably guilty, or, at the very least, the burden will be placed on that
defendant to prove his or her innocence . . . [Generic prejudice] . . .
involves the juror’s inability to impartially decide whether in fact a
crime has occurred or, if it has occurred, whether the defendant is
the guilty party.93
Crimes like child sexual abuse evoke intense anger. The problem this anger
presents, for purposes of juror deliberation, is that it is often accompanied
by a strong impetus toward action. Anger toward those accused of terrible
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crimes may quickly translate into a desire to attack and to punish. Jurors
want to right the wrong; to restore order, and to help the victim.94 Joseph
Nadler and Mary Rose theorize that the “exposure to intense emotional
suffering heightens decision makers’ negative affect and consequently acti-
vates ‘blame-validation processing,’” a state in which jurors “look for ways
to hold an offender responsible.”95 The need to find a target for blame may
override the desire to ensure that the correct target has been chosen.
Moreover, any natural inclination to convict and punish in the day care
abuse cases was exacerbated by the jury’s limited access to evidence. Depend-
ing on the case, it was limited by partial investigations by police and prosecu-
tors, by prosecutorial failure to share exculpatory information with the
defense,96 by a lack of information about the investigative techniques leading
up to the testimony they heard,97 and by judicial rulings permitting certain
expert witnesses and excluding others.98 It is not surprising that jurors should
not get “the whole story,” this is, after all, the nature of the trial process.99 The
salient point is that the forces discussed above, all of which tended to tilt away
from presuming innocence and toward a rush for judgment, would coalesce
once again at the trial. It is also noteworthy that some of this rush to judgment
would come in the form of rulings from the bench.
In this story of judgment clouded by passion, the role of the judge may
be the most difficult to accept. Even those who readily believe in the par-
tiality of police and prosecutors may have difficulty letting go of the image
of judicial dispassion. The film makes it apparent, however, that Judge
Abbey Boklan bears tremendous responsibility for the hysteria as well. In
the film, Judge Boklan, a former sex crimes prosecutor, assures the audi-
ence “there was never a doubt in my mind as to their guilt.” Yet her actions
helped ensure that the trial at which this guilt might be determined did not
take place. Her decision to permit cameras in the courtroom for the first
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time in the history of Nassau County contributed greatly to what she de-
scribed as “a media frenzy.” Jesse cited Arnold’s televised guilty plea to
numerous counts of child sexual abuse as a large factor in his own decision
to plead, convinced that he could not get a fair trial.100 Boklan told Andrew
Jarecki that she decided to allow cameras in the courtroom because:
It was something the community was very interested in, the media was
very interested in, and I believe in open courtrooms and as long as the
names of the children and the children could be protected I saw no
harm in it. I wasn’t that concerned about protecting the defendants.
Their pictures, their names were all over the newspapers, so their repu-
tation at that point was not too good.101
IV. Moral Panic and its Legal Handmaidens: 
The Lessons of Capturing the Friedmans
Is moral panic a useful heuristic? Does it help us to understand and address
what happened here? Or is it useful only in hindsight? The concept is a
useful reminder that the attitudes which shape the law occur within a social,
cultural, and institutional framework. Unfortunately, as I have argued, this
knowledge is most usable in retrospect. Once the day care abuse prosecu-
tions had begun to unravel it was possible, with hindsight, to replace the
narratives of nationwide child pornography rings and satanic abuse cults
with a narrative of moral panic leading to injustice. It was possible to the-
orize about why day care sexual abuse became such an idée fixe, to exam-
ine the role of institutions, and to ask what might be done to prevent this
particular type of panic from occurring again. For example, in their after-
math it became clear that the investigations were fueled in part by misap-
prehensions of children’s cognitive development.102 Largely because of
these cases, the fields of psychology and law have become more know-
ledgeable about children’s conceptions of truth and about the importance
of training investigators in appropriate interview techniques.103
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In short, the concept of moral panic may offer some lessons about how
justice is derailed. But to the extent the term is meant to describe a time-
limited, volatile phenomenon, one which “erupts fairly suddenly and,
nearly as suddenly, subsides,”104 it does not capture the essence of the prob-
lem depicted in Capturing the Friedmans, which is a problem that infects the
legal system on a much broader and deeper level.
Recently, sociologists have argued that early formulations of the notion
of moral panic need revision because they misconceive the dynamic as a
series of isolated phenomena emanating from “one or two centralized
agencies of social control” when in fact it is “a permanent struggle,” the
product of policies and practices that are “endemic in media and society.”105
This critique is well founded, as the child sexual abuse cases illustrate. This
series of prosecutions can be framed as a time-limited phenomenon, but
many of its root causes persist. It can be framed as a failure of social workers,
the media, or the law, but in fact it illustrates the close symbiosis among all
the relevant institutions.106
Justice was derailed in these cases for reasons that are deeply entrenched,
entirely predictable, and very difficult to address. Such cases share a number
of common characteristics that can be identified and addressed in advance.
These are cases that evoke fear, revulsion, and other intense emotions of the
sort that cloud judgment; cases based on deep-seated stereotypes and preju-
dices. Viewed from that perspective, they can be seen to have much in com-
mon with other types of cases that elicit intense fear and revulsion, and that
rest on deep-seated prejudices. For example, they share marked similarities
with death penalty cases and with police torture cases. Considering the fail-
ures of justice in these varied contexts yields insight into what goes wrong,
and how it might be fixed. This seems a more useful exercise than debat-
ing, in retrospect, whether a spectacular failure of justice should be classi-
fied as a moral panic.
The day care sexual abuse cases were fueled by revulsion toward the
accused, or the category of those accused of child sexual abuse. In this sense,
child sexual abuse cases have much in common with capital cases. Both rest
on accusations of horrific crimes; crimes that are often difficult to contem-
plate. The notion that people are capable of such crimes makes the world
seem less safe. These crimes evoke a need to ward off chaos by holding some-
one accountable. They evoke a sense of responsibility to the victims that
seems to demand meting out a punishment to fit the crime. The perpetrator
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of such a crime becomes dehumanized, a monstrous offender,107 not someone
like us who took a few wrong turns in life. To regard such a person as any-
thing less than purely evil comes to be seen as relativistic and weak.108 To fail
to convict such a person, or to fail to punish him adequately, is a symbolic act:
a sign of disrespect to the victims and a failure to protect society. In such cases,
the drive to convict and punish colors every aspect of the legal process, often
in ways that are difficult to detect.
The cases were fueled in part by the virtually unreviewable discretion of
elected prosecutors, by media excesses that have been decried for years,109
and by elected judges who could not afford to seem soft on child molesters
or heinous murderers.110 These are all longstanding problems that, for a
variety of reasons, are unlikely to be addressed any time soon.
Conversely, the police brutality cases I mentioned above provide a mir-
ror image of the day care panic. Like the scandal of pedophilia in the clergy,
the South Side Chicago police torture scandal of the 1970’s was a case of
institutional denial rather than institutional hysteria; a refusal to connect
the dots rather than the fabrication of a pattern where none existed.111 Yet
many of the elements discussed above derailed justice here as well. The
generic prejudice ran against those who claimed to have been tortured:
poor, black, marginal men, most of them accused of crimes, some with
police records. It was their word against that of police officers – mostly
white, middle class men in uniform, many of them decorated war veterans.
The fear of chaos arose, not from the specter of letting crime go unpun-
ished, but from admitting the possibility that the police, the thin blue line
between the law abiding and the criminal, could engage in such unspeak-
able acts. It was far more comforting to reject this possibility – not just for
the lay public, but for the legal system.112 Whereas careers are made and
elections won by prosecuting and convicting child molesters, and by send-
ing murderers to the chair, prosecuting and convicting cops is usually a
futile and self-destructive gesture. In the police torture cases, in short, fear,
disgust and generic prejudice led to minimizing rather than exaggerating
the harm; to disaggregating a series of connected events, rather than to
yoking together a series of disconnected events.
The moral panic framework helps us understand that certain acts may
evoke especially strong passions at particular cultural junctures. For example
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societal attitudes toward children (as small adults, as unspoiled creatures of
nature, as preternaturally honest, as super-predators, as out of control gang
members) and toward young girls (as innocent maidens, as vixens, as mean
girls, as juvenile delinquents) shift over time and our attitudes toward crime
by and against children shifts with it – often rather emphatically. Knowledge
of these shifts, ideally, can serve as a reminder of the importance of proceed-
ing with caution.
Neither capital murder nor police torture seems to fit neatly into the
moral panic framework. Murder violates widely-held norms that remain
stable across time, and murders that are capitally charged tend to be espe-
cially shocking. Nevertheless, cultural assumptions contribute to many of
our perceptions about murder (for example what separates murder from
manslaughter;113 what sorts of murders are most prevalent and pose the
greatest danger;114 what constitutes a crime wave) and to many aspects of
capital punishment (for example, changing levels of support for the death
penalty,115 or the factors that render a particular category of crime death-
eligible116). Similarly, police torture is too often insulated from judicial
oversight because of deeply-rooted cultural assumptions about what sorts
of people threaten the social order and what must be tolerated in order to
keep them in line. Shifts in such assumptions may not be sudden or volatile,
and thus may not fit the moral panic criteria, but some core insights of the
moral panic literature apply. Context helps shape not only our criminal
justice priorities but our perceptions about what constitutes deviance and
what remedies deviance requires. At the same time, across the spectrum of
cases in which justice fails, certain factors remain constant.
All these cases – child sexual abuse, capital murder, police torture – are
rife with stereotyping, prejudice, fear and disgust. They are at high risk for
failures of due process and for unjust or disproportionate outcomes. These
outcomes cannot usually be blamed on single, malevolent individuals; the
failures are systemic. This is something we know, and that we can therefore
try to address, not by denying human nature, but by building in procedures
to slow the rush to judgment, enhance the possibility of reflection and
deliberation, channel emotion to minimize its distorting effects, and correct
for human nature’s inevitable lapses and fallibilities.117 There is ample litera-
ture on practices that reduce the likelihood of miscarriages of justice,
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including mandated deliberation periods before charges can be brought,118
better training and education of investigators, social workers, and other
personnel who gather evidence and make recommendations to the court,119
corroboration requirements to decrease the possibility of relying on unreli-
able testimony, videotaping of interrogations of witnesses and suspects,120
layers of review at every stage – including review of police and prosecutor-
ial charging decisions, merit selection of judges, provision of adequate
defense counsel and support,121 and many others.122 There are formidable
institutional hurdles to many of these reforms, and indeed much of the
problem stems from the failure to follow existing rules, but some progress
has been made nevertheless. We might look back at the nine year moral
panic over day care sexual abuse, with its outlandish stories about satanic
cults, marvel at how gullible we once were, and congratulate ourselves for
what we’ve learned. But that would be the wrong lesson. Most of our work
still lies ahead.
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